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ABSTRACT
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the as-
sumption that players have perfect rationality and that they always
play an equilibrium strategy. In contrast, research in experimental
economics shows that in bargaining between human subjects, par-
ticipants do not always play the equilibrium strategy. Such agents
are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against a
boundedly rational opponent, a player’s most effective strategy is
not the equilibrium strategy, but the one that is the best reply to
the opponent’s actual strategy. Against this background, this pa-
per studies the bargaining behavior of boundedly rational agents by
using genetic algorithms. Since bargaining involves players with
different utility functions, we have two subpopulations – one rep-
resents the buyer, and the other represents the seller (i.e., the pop-
ulation is asymmetric). We study the competitive co-evolution of
strategies in the two subpopulations for an incomplete information
setting, and compare the results with those prescribed by game the-
ory. Our analysis leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, our study
shows that although each agent in the game-theoretic model has a
strategy that is dominant at every period at which it makes a move,
the stable state of the evolutionary model does not always match
the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome. Secondly, as the players
mutually adapt to each other’s strategy, the stable outcome depends
on the initial population.
1. INTRODUCTION
Existing game-theoretic models of bargaining [13, 14, 15] are
predicated on the presumption that agents are perfectly rational,
and that this rationality is common knowledge. The participants
in these models compute the equilibrium strategy from a theoret-
ical analysis of the game and always play that strategy. In con-
trast, researchinexperimental economics [12]suggests thatthe per-
fect rationality assumption does not apply in human settings. This
research shows that human participants learn how to play games
through trial and error, and do not compute the equilibrium from
a theoretical analysis of the game. Rather, they experiment with
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
AAMAS-03 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V (AMEC-
V) 2003 Melbourne, Australia.
strategies, observe their payoffs, try other strategies and ﬁnd their
way to a strategy that works well. Such players are said to be
boundedly rational. This result means game theory cannot always
be used as a guide to behavior. An agent’s optimal actions may
be quite different depending upon whether it is playing against a
perfectly rational agent or a boundedly rational person.
This divergence led to the use of evolutionary methods for study-
ing the bargaining behavior of boundedly rational agents [18, 9,
4, 17, 1, 3]. Although for certain games the game-theoretic and
evolutionary equilibria coincide [17, 16], in general, it has been
shown that the game-theoretic outcome may not always be valid
when playing against boundedly rational agents [2]. For instance,
[18] and [4] show this in their evolutionary model for the Nash de-
mand game, as do Binmore et al [1] intheir evolutionary analysis of
Rubinstein’s alternating offers game of complete information [13]
that has a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Generally speaking, how-
ever, this existingwork comparing game-theoretic and evolutionary
outcomes is based on two main assumptions. Firstly, agents have
complete information about the bargaining parameters. Secondly,
agents are drawn from a single population, in which all individu-
als have the same utility function. However, we believe both of
these assumptions are unlikely to be true in most practical applica-
tions. To rectify this shortcoming, our objective in this paper is to
assess to what extent the evolutionary computation of agent strate-
giesmatches thegame-theoretic resultsfor morerealisticscenarios.
Thus, we focus not only on an incomplete information setting, but
also treat the population as asymmetric.
Speciﬁcally, the bargaining behavior of boundedly rational play-
ers is studied using genetic algorithms (GAs) in which the popula-
tion is composed of twoseparate subpopulations – one representing
the buyer and the other representing the seller. We use such asym-
metric populations because buyers and sellers have fundamentally
different aims and objectives (here represented by different utility
functions). Moreover, the buyer and the seller each have time con-
straints in the form of a deadline and a bargaining cost. In this
model, which has been analysed game-theoretically in [7], each
agent has a unique strategy that is dominant at every time period at
which it makes a move.
In short, the main contribution of this paper is to provide an
evolutionary analysis of the above model and compare it with its
game-theoretic counterpart. In more detail, our work extends the
existing work on comparison of game-theoretic and evolutionary
equilibria in the following three ways. Firstly, we analyze games of
incomplete information that also have time constraints. Secondly,
we study the competitive co-evolution of strategies for asymmetric
games. Thirdly, our work also highlights the inﬂuence of the initial0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Figure 1: Negotiation decision functions for the buyer.
population on the stable state of the evolutionary model. The re-
sults we obtain can then be used to select between the approaches
for agent mediated electronic commerce applications, since this de-
cision making involves not only a comparison of the outcomes they
generate but also the feasibility of their implementation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of our negotiation model. The equilibrium out-
comes for this model are presented in Section 3. Section 4 explains
the evolutionary system. The results of our experiments are de-
scribed inSection 5. Section6 discusses relatedwork and Section7
gives some conclusions and states our future work.
2. THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
We assume that a buyer
￿ and a seller
￿ bargain over the price
of a good/service. Each agent has an initial price (
￿
￿)a tw h i c h
it starts negotiation and a reservation price (
￿
￿) beyond which it
does not concede. Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denote the range of values for
price that are acceptable to agent
￿,w h e r e
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿;
￿
￿ denotes
agent
￿’s opponent. A price that is acceptable to both
￿ and
￿,
i.e., the zone of agreement
￿
￿
￿, is the interval
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.T h e
difference between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ is called the price-surplus.
￿
￿
denotes agent
￿’s deadline. Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denote the price offered by
￿
to
￿ at time
￿. We use an alternating offers protocol for our study.
Negotiation starts when the ﬁrst offer is made. When an agent,
say
￿, receives an offer at time
￿, i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, it rates the offer using
its utility function
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is greater than the utility
of the counter-offer agent
￿ is ready to send at time
￿
￿, i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
with
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then agent
￿ accepts. Otherwise a counter-offer is
made. This process of making offers and counter-offers continues
until either an agreement is reached, or a deadline is reached.
Since both agents have a deadline, we assume that they use a
time dependent tactic (i.e., linear, Boulware, or Conceder [5]) for
generating offers. These tactics vary the price depending on the
remaining negotiation time. In these functions, the predominant
factor used to decide which value to offer next is the time
￿.T h e
initial offer is a point in the interval
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Agents deﬁne
a constant
￿
￿, that, when multiplied by the size of the interval,
determines the price to be offered in the ﬁrst proposal by
￿.T h e
offer made by
￿ at time
￿ (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)i sd e ﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h e
negotiation decision function (NDF),
￿
￿, as follows:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿.
A wide range of functions can be deﬁned by varying the way
in which
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is computed. However, functions must ensure that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .T h a ti s ,t h eo f f e r
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Figure 2: Illustration of agreement and negotiation conﬂict.
will always be between the value range, at the beginning it will give
the initial constant, and when the deadline is reached it will offer
the reservation value. The function
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is deﬁned as follows:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
An inﬁnite number of functions can be deﬁned for different val-
ues of
￿. However, the following two extreme sets show clearly
different patterns of behavior [11] (see Figure 1).
1. Boulware (B). For this function
￿
￿
￿, and the initial offer
is maintained till time is almost exhausted, when the agent
concedes up to its reservation value.
2. Conceder (C). For this function
￿
￿
￿, and the agent goes
to its reservation value very quickly
1.W h e n
￿
￿
￿ ,p r i c ei s
increased linearly (L).
The value of a counter-offer depends on the initial price (IP) at
whichtheagent startsnegotiation, theﬁnalprice(FP),beyond which
it does not concede,
￿,a n d
￿
￿. A tuple,
￿
￿, of these four variables,
i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, forms agent
￿’s strategy.T h ene-
gotiation outcome
￿
￿
￿ is an element of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e r e(
￿
￿
￿)
denotes the price and time of agreement and
￿
￿ denotes the conﬂict
outcome.
As an illustration, when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, the outcome
￿
￿
￿
￿ that resultsis shown in Fig-
ure 2. In this ﬁgure, and in all subsequent ones, the thick lines de-
note
￿’s strategy and the dashed lines denote
￿’s strategy. As shown
in the ﬁgure, agreement (
￿
￿) is reached at a price
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and at a time close to
￿
￿. But when the NDF in
both strategies is replaced with C, agreement (
￿
￿) is reached at
the same price but near the beginning of negotiation. Figure 2(b)
illustrates a negotiation conﬂict; where the strategies for
￿ and
￿
are
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. As agents have different deadlines and both agents use
the
￿ function, the strategies do not converge and result in a con-
ﬂict. In general, an agent can avoid conﬂict by using a strategy that
offers a mutually acceptable price (i.e., within
￿) by a mutually
acceptable time (the earlier deadline).
Agents’ utilitiesaredeﬁnedwiththefollowingtwofunctions that
incorporate the effects of bargaining costs:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿.
￿As
￿ increases(decreases)
￿ becomes more Conceder(Boulware).
At very high(low) values of
￿,
￿ is an extreme Con-
ceder(Boulware).For an agent,
￿
￿
￿ increases with time if its bargaining cost,
￿
￿
￿ ,i s
greater than 0. Consequently, the agent gains utility over time and
has the incentive to reach a late agreement. But if
￿
￿
￿ decreases
with time (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿), then the agent loses over time and has
an incentive to reach an early agreement. Agents are said to have
similar time preferences if both gain on time or both lose on time;
otherwise they have conﬂicting time preferences.
An agent’s utility from agreement is always higher than its con-
ﬂict utility. Each agent therefore prefers to reach an agreement
rather than disagree and not reach any agreement.
3. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
Each agent has a reservation limit, a deadline, and a bargaining
cost. Thus
￿and
￿eachhave threeparameters denoted
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ respectively. The negotiation outcome depends
on all these six parameters. An agent’s strategic behavior depends
on the information it has about the bargaining parameters. The in-
formation state,
￿
￿, of agent
￿ is the information it has about the
negotiation parameters. An agent’s own parameters are known to
it, but the information it has about the opponent’s parameters is not
complete. We consider the case where each agent knows its oppo-
nent’s reservation price, i.e.,
￿
￿ is deﬁned as follows:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿.
An agent, say
￿’s, optimal strategy depends on the opponent’s strat-
egy. Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. As shown in Figure 3, the possible strategies for
￿ are
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿,o r
￿
￿
￿. For each of these three
￿’s strategies, the
strategy that gives
￿ the maximum utility is
￿
￿
￿ (out of
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿
￿), since it results in agreement at the lowest price and at the lat-
est time. For the sake of clarity, Figure 3 shows only the extreme
Boulware and Conceder functions. However, note that
￿
￿
￿ forms
￿’s
optimal strategy over the entire strategy space that lies between the
extreme Boulware and the extreme Conceder. Thus, when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿’s optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Analogously,
￿’s op-
timal strategy when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I th a s
been shown in [7] that the equilibrium strategy proﬁle for the above
information state is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
More speciﬁcally,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ formsasequential equilibrium where
￿
￿
￿
is
￿’s dominant strategy whenever it is
￿’s turn to make a move, and
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s dominant strategy whenever it is
￿’s turn to move. More-
over, this equilibrium is unique. The equilibrium strategies result
in an agreement at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e r e
￿ denotes
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
￿ denotes the earlier deadline. In other words,
the price-surplus goes to the agent with the longer deadline, and an
agreement is always reached at the earlier deadline. The equilib-
rium strategies and the corresponding outcomes for the remaining
scenarios (i.e., when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,o r
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,o r
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) are summarised in Table 1 (see [7] for details).
4. THE EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM
The evolutionary model imagines a game as being played not by
a single set of players, but by large populations of players. These
players are repeatedly and randomly matched to play the game.
Each agent is characterized by a strategy that it plays when it is
matched. As play proceeds, it observes the payoff of this strategy.
It also observes the payoffs and strategies of others (within its pop-
ulation), and has access to information concerning how others have
played. In the light of these observations, it adjusts its strategies.
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Equilibrium
Outcome
G,G
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
G,L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L,L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
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￿
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￿
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Table 1: Equilibrium strategies and outcomes for different ne-
gotiation scenarios.
! indicates
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
" indicates
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
￿ denotes
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
￿ denotes
the earlier deadline and
￿
￿ denotes the second time period.
These adjustments involve experimenting with strategies that it has
not tried, with the overall aim of switching away from strategies
that give low payoffs to strategies that give high payoffs.
Since bargaining involves two agents with different utility func-
tions, we treat the population as being composed of two different
subpopulations; one representing the buyer and the other represent-
ing the seller. In such asymmetric populations, the evolution of
strategies in each subpopulation affects the evolution of strategies
in the other subpopulation, (i.e., the strategies co-evolve). Thus
we study the competitive co-evolution in which the ﬁtness of an
individual in one population is based on direct competition with
individuals of the other population.
We represent an agent’s ﬁtness with its utility function and apply
the three standard operations of selection, crossover,a n dmutation.
An agent’s strategy was deﬁned in Section 2 as a tuple of four ele-
ments, viz., the initial price, the ﬁnal price, the negotiation decision
function and the deadline. Each individual is represented as a string
of ﬁxed length. The bits of the string (the genes) represent the four
elements of an agent’s strategy. The range of values for these genes
are as follows. Since each agent knows its opponent’s reservation
price (see information stateof an agent deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3 ) ,w eﬁx
￿
￿
￿ to be
￿
￿
￿
￿. This is because agreement can never take place
outside the zone of agreement. The ﬁnal price lies in the range
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (i.e.,
￿). The NDF can be anywhere between an ex-
treme Boulware and an extreme Conceder for both the agents. The
last element is the time at which the ﬁnal price is offered. Since
each agent knows its own deadline, we ﬁx the last element of the
strategy at the agent’s deadline. In other words, the ﬁrst and the last
elements of the strategy are ﬁxed and do not change. For these two
ﬁxed values
2, the GA needs to ﬁnd the most effective strategy by
varying the
￿
￿ and the NDF. (i.e., the second and third elements
of the strategy tuple).
The different stages in an iteration of the GA are as follows. In-
dividuals in the two subpopulations are initialisedwith some strate-
gies. How the two populations are initialised is explained in Sec-
tion 5. Once initialised, the parent agents in one of the populations,
say the buyer population, start the negotiation process. The ﬁt-
ness of the parent agents in both the populations is determined by
competition between the agents in the two populations. Each agent
competes against all the agents inthe other population. The average
utility obtained in these negotiations is then used as the agent’s ﬁt-
ness value. In the next stage, offspring agents are created for each
￿Although the ﬁrst and last elements of the strategy tuple could be
treated as search parameters, we treated them as constants in order
to reduce the search space. Note that this encoding includes all
possible feasible agreements in the search space, and excludes only
that part of the search space where an agreement can never take
place (i.e., points outside
￿ or beyond the deadline). Consequently
the time taken to reach the stable state is reduced.TT
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Figure 3: Possible buyer and seller strategies when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
population using the standard operations of selection, crossover,
and mutation. Each of these operations is explained below.
The buyer and seller population size were each set to
#.S e -
lection was carried out using the ﬁtness proportionate selection
method [10], where individuals are chosen with a probability pro-
portional to their ﬁtness. To perform crossover within a population,
we select two individuals randomly. Two crossover points are then
chosen randomly and sorted in ascending order. Then the genes
between the successive crossover points are alternately exchanged
between the individuals with probability
￿
￿. Mutation is the pro-
cess of creating completely new strategies that are not present in
the initial population. To perform mutation, a gene (in our case, the
second or the third element of the strategy tuple) is selected ran-
domly, and a random value is chosen for it from the domain of the
gene. We perform mutation on the second and third elements of the
strategy tuple because an optimal value needs to be found for these
two elements. The mutation rate was
￿
￿. We determined the sta-
ble outcome for different values of
#,
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿ in the ranges 20
to 75, 0.1 to 0.9, and 0.005 to 0.05 respectively. Increasing the pop-
ulation size beyond 50 did not change the stable outcome but only
increased the time to stabilize. The stable outcome was, on an av-
erage, found to be closest to the equilibrium outcome for
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿,
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿.
To indicate that ﬁtness proportionate selection is a reasonable
method in this case, we carried out the above set of experiments
using the other common selection method, namely tournament se-
lection [10] with a tournament size of 2. Between the two selec-
tion methods, the stable outcome generated by ﬁtness proportion-
ate selection was, on average, found to be closer to the equilibrium
outcome. Section 5 therefore describes the evolutionary experi-
ments for the ﬁtness proportionate selection method for
#
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿,a n d
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿.
Note that all genetic operations are carried out within a subpop-
ulation, i.e., there is no transfer of strategies across the two sub-
populations. The simulations stop when the population is stable,
i.e.,
￿
￿
￿ of the individuals in each subpopulation have the same
ﬁtness, for 10 successive generations. This is because, depending
on the initializationof the subpopulations, all the individuals in one
or both of the subpopulations can have the same ﬁtness values in
the ﬁrst iteration itself.
5. THE EVOLUTIONARY EXPERIMENTS
This section determines the stable outcomes and shows how the
initial population affects these outcomes. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2, the deadlines are different for
￿ and
￿.L e t
￿
￿ denote the
agent with the longer deadline and
￿
￿
￿ the one with the shorter
deadline. Let
￿
$
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ denote the corresponding popula-
tions. To determine if the stable outcome depends on the initial
population, we ran the GA for the following different initial popu-
lations for each of the four possible negotiation scenarios listed in
Table 1.
￿
￿ Both
￿
$
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ are initialised to the game-theoretic
equilibrium strategies given in Section 3.
￿
￿ One of the populations is initialised to the equilibrium strat-
egyand the other tosome random non-equilibrium strategies.
￿
￿ Both
￿
$
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ are initialised to some random non-
equilibrium strategies.
5.1 Both buyer and seller prefer a late agree-
ment (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)
The stable state for each of the three initializations is explained be-
low. When all the individuals in each subpopulation are initialised
to their respective equilibrium strategies (i.e.,
￿
￿), the stable out-
come was identical to the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome. As
seen in Section 3, in the equilibrium outcome for this scenario,
the entire price-surplus goes to the agent with the longer dead-
line. This evolutionary behavior can be explained by examining
how the strategies in the two subpopulations co-evolve. Consider
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ (which represents the buyer) ﬁrst. Since all the individu-
als in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ are initialised to the equilibrium strategy (see Fig-
ure 4(a)), they all have the same average ﬁtness values after the
ﬁrst round of negotiations. The other population, i.e.,
￿
$
￿
￿,i s
also initialised to its equilibrium strategy, which gives all its in-
dividuals the same average ﬁtness values after the ﬁrst round of
negotiations. The new non-equilibrium strategies that get intro-
duced in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, due to mutation
3, either have a lower value for
￿
￿ than the
￿
￿ in
￿
￿
￿
￿, or an NDF that differs from the NDF in
￿
￿
￿
￿. These strategies mostly conﬂict with the vast majority of equi-
librium strategies of
￿
$
￿
￿ (the non-equilibrium strategies that are
subsequently introduced into
￿
$
￿
￿ form a very small fraction of
the entire population), resulting in relatively inferior ﬁtness values,
and eventually dying out, while the equilibrium strategies, being
superior, survive to future generations. Turning now to
￿
$
￿
￿,t h e
new non-equilibrium strategies that are generated in
￿
$
￿
￿ have a
higher value for
￿
￿ than the
￿
￿ in
￿
￿
￿
￿. In addition, the NDF can
be linear, Boulware or Conceder. Those strategies that use a Con-
ceder or linear NDF result in agreement at a lower price, yield a
ﬁtness value that is lower than the equilibrium strategy ﬁtness, and
as a result do not survive. Those non-equilibrium strategies that use
the Boulware NDF result in the same outcome as the equilibrium
strategies. In other words, even in
￿
$
￿
￿, only those individuals that
￿Since all the individuals play the same strategy, crossover does not
yield new strategies. Crossover between two identical strategies
results in the same strategy.RP
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Figure 4: Buyer and seller population initialization.
play the equilibrium strategy reach the stable state. The majority of
individuals in both the populations continue to play their respective
equilibrium strategies. The stable outcome is therefore identical to
the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome.
For the second initialization
￿
￿
￿
￿, the stable outcome was found
to depend on the initial population corresponding to the agent with
the earlier deadline. There are two possibilities for
￿
￿
￿
￿. Either
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿ with its equilibrium strat-
egy, or
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised with its equilibrium strategy and
￿
$
￿
￿
randomly. Each of these is explained below. When
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is ini-
tialised with the equilibrium strategy and
￿
$
￿
￿ is initialised ran-
domly, both the populations stabilised at the equilibrium strategies.
To understand this, consider
￿
$
￿
￿
￿. The initial populations for
this scenario are depicted in Figure 5(a). Since all the individu-
als in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ play the same strategy, they all have the same ﬁt-
ness values. The new strategies that are generated from mutation
are non-equilibrium strategies. The individuals that play the equi-
librium strategy have a higher ﬁtness than those playing the non-
equilibrium strategy. The new strategies introduced from mutation
thus get eliminated, while the equilibrium strategy prevails. The
other population, i.e.,
￿
$
￿
￿, is initialised randomly, resulting in a
different ﬁtness value to each individual. The closer the strategy
is to the equilibrium strategy, the higher its ﬁtness. The close-to-
equilibrium strategies thus ﬂourish in
￿
$
￿
￿ at the expense of the
non-equilibrium strategies. The behavior of
￿
$
￿
￿ adapts to best
suit the predominantly equilibrium strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿.
￿
$
￿
￿’s best
reply to
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is the equilibrium strategy. Thus
￿
$
￿
￿ dynamically
changes its strategy and stabilizes at the equilibrium strategy. Both
populations thus stabilize at the equilibrium strategy.
For
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e n
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ was initialised randomly, the stable out-
come was found to be different from the equilibrium outcome. The
agent with the earlier deadline obtains a higher utility than its util-
ity from the equilibrium outcome. But the agent with the longer
deadline gets a lower than equilibrium utility. This is explained as
follows. Consider
￿
$
￿
￿ ﬁrst, which is initialised to the equilibrium
strategy. The equilibrium strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿ conﬂicts with most of
the strategies of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, since they are non-equilibrium (see Fig-
ure 5(b)). Moreover, since all individuals play the same strategy,
the ﬁtness values are the same for all of them, and correspond to the
conﬂict outcome. The new strategies that are generated from mu-
tation, although being non-equilibrium strategies, result in agree-
ment and are thereby ﬁtter than the equilibrium strategies (recall
that an agreement always gives an agent a higher utility than its
conﬂict utility). The number of non-equilibrium strategies thus in-
creases from one generation to the next. But the rate of this change
is very slow, since most of the individuals play the equilibrium
strategy. The chances that two strategies selected for crossover are
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Figure 5: Buyer and seller population initialization
￿
￿.
identical is high. Crossover between two identical strategies yields
the same strategy. Thus while mutation can yield a new strategy,
the chance of generating new strategies through crossover is low.
￿
$
￿
￿ thus has a very low rate of change. The other population,
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, is initialised randomly but the ﬁtness levels of the individ-
uals in this population too are equal, and correspond to the con-
ﬂict outcome. However, as non-equilibrium strategies get gener-
ated in
￿
$
￿
￿, the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ have different ﬁtness levels
since they play random strategies. Since all individuals play differ-
ent strategies, the rate of evolution of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is faster than
￿
$
￿
￿.
Eventually,
￿
$
￿
￿ evolves towards a strategy that differs slightly
from the equilibrium strategy, since only such strategies result in
a better agreement with the non-equilibrium strategies of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿,
and yield a higher payoff than the conﬂict outcome. On the other
hand,
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ evolves towards a strategy that is the best reply to
this non-equilibrium strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿. Both populations thus shift
away from the initial conﬂict outcome and eventually stabilize at a
non-equilibrium one.
Forinitialization
￿
￿
￿
￿,where both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ areinitialised
randomly, the stable state was again different from the theoretical
equilibrium outcome. It was also different from the stable state for
the case where
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ was initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿ with its
equilibrium strategy.
Theexperimentsfor each oftheinitialisations
￿
￿,
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿ were
repeated 50 times. Despite the presence of randomness, we found
that the outcomes in these different runs did not vary by more than
￿
￿ and the relationship between the outcomes for
￿
￿,
￿
￿,a n d
￿
￿
always remained the same. These results (averaged over all the
runs) are summarised in Table 2. For all the runs,
￿
￿
￿ was 100,
￿
￿
￿ was 20,
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ were both greater than 0,
￿
￿ was 90, and
￿
￿ was 195. As seen in the table, an agreement is always reached
at the earlier deadline (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). The price of agreement lies
between
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and is close to
￿
￿
￿,t h e
reservation price of the agent with the earlier deadline.
Table 2 also shows that the dominant strategy for
￿
￿
￿ (which
represents the buyer) is to initialize the population randomly since
this results in agreement at a lower price. The dominant strategy
for
￿
￿ (which represents the seller) is to initialize all the individuals
with its equilibrium strategy. Note that
￿ and
￿ have similar time
preferences. The time of agreement in all cases was the earlier
deadline, which gives the maximum possible utility from time to
both the agents. The price of agreement favours
￿
￿.
To sum up, these experiments show that when each population
learns and adapts its behavior to best suit the opponent’s behavior,
the stable outcome is not always the same as the game-theoretic
equilibrium outcome.Equilibrium Strategy Random
Eq. Strategy (100,90) (100,90)
Random (95,90) (80,90)
Table 2: Stable outcomes for different initialisations. Rows in-
dicate
￿ and columns indicate
￿.T h e ﬁrst entry in each pair
denotes the price, and the second entry the time of agreement.
5.2 Bothbuyerandsellerpreferanearlyagree-
ment (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)
The set of experiments described above was repeated for the case
where both
￿ and
￿ lose utility on time. The stable outcome was
the same as the equilibrium outcome, irrespective of whether the
twosubpopulations wereinitialisedwiththeequilibrium strategy or
randomly. This is explained below. Consider the case where both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are initialised with their respective equilibrium
strategies (i.e.,
￿
￿). All the individuals have the same ﬁtness levels,
and new strategies that get generated from mutation, being rela-
tively inferior, do not reach the stable state. The stable outcome is
therefore the sameas theequilibrium outcome. The situationwhere
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿ is initialised with its equi-
librium strategy (i.e.,
￿
￿) is depicted in Figure 4(b). As seen in the
ﬁgure, all the interactions initially result in an agreement. More-
over, the ﬁtness level of all the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿ is the same,
since they all play the equilibrium strategy. The new strategies that
are generated by means of mutation, being inferior to the equilib-
rium strategy, get eliminated. This is because the constant
￿
￿
￿ in our
utility function is greater than the constant
￿
￿
￿ (see Section 2 for the
deﬁnition ofutilityfunction which isused asanindividuals ﬁtness).
On the other hand, the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ have different ﬁtness
values, as they all play different random strategies. The closer a
strategy to the equilibrium strategy, the higher its ﬁtness.
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
thus evolves to its equilibrium strategy. Both the subpopulations
thus stabilize at their respective equilibrium strategies and result in
a stable outcome that is identical to the equilibrium outcome.
When
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ isinitialisedwiththeequilibriumstrategyand
￿
$
￿
￿
is initialised randomly, the stable outcome was the same as the
equilibrium outcome. As in the previous case, all the interactions
initially result in an agreement but,
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ remains stable at the
equilibrium strategy, while
￿
$
￿
￿ evolves towards its equilibrium
strategy. This co-evolution of strategies eventually results in the
same stable outcome as the equilibrium outcome.
Finally, when both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are initialised randomly
(i.e.,
￿
￿), both populations stabilized at the game-theoretic equi-
librium strategy.
To sum up, when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, the stable outcome always
matched the equilibrium outcome.
5.3 Buyerprefersanearlyagreementandseller
prefers a late one (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)
When both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are initialised to their respective equi-
librium strategies (i.e.,
￿
￿), as in the previous two subsections, the
stable outcome was the same as the equilibrium outcome. For
￿
￿,
when
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿ with its equilibrium
strategy, then the stable outcome was the same as the equilibrium
outcome. In the initial populations depicted in Figure 6(b), the ﬁrst
round of negotiations mostly result in conﬂict between the equilib-
rium strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿ and the random strategies of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿.M o r e -
over, almost all the individuals in both the populations have the
same ﬁtness value, which is equal to the conﬂict utility. In the next
generation, the new strategies that are generated through mutation
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Figure 6: Buyer and seller population initialization when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
in
￿
$
￿
￿, have a different NDF. They are either less Boulware, lin-
ear, or Conceder and result in agreement with some or all of the
strategies of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿. However the majority of the individuals still
play the equilibrium strategy, and thereby have the same ﬁtness.
￿
$
￿
￿ thus evolves slowly. Looking at
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ we see that, since
all individuals play a different strategy, it evolves relatively faster
than
￿
$
￿
￿. This is because new strategies are generated in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
through two operations (viz., crossover and mutation) as opposed
to the generation of new strategies in
￿
$
￿
￿ through mutation alone.
In other words, as
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ evolves faster, it moves towards the strat-
egythat isthemost effectivereplytothepredominantly equilibrium
strategy played by
￿
$
￿
￿. Eventually,
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ stabilizes at its equi-
librium strategy and
￿
$
￿
￿ stabilizes at a strategy that is slightly less
Boulware than its equilibrium strategy. The stable and equilibrium
strategies for
￿ (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿) are depicted in Figure 8(a). As seen
in the ﬁgure, although the stable strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿ is not the same
as the equilibrium strategy, agreement is still reached at the same
point as the equilibrium outcome. This is because the difference
in price between the two strategies (
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿), is high at
￿
￿,
and almost zero near the beginning of negotiation. Since
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
stabilises at its equilibrium strategy, which uses the Conceder func-
tion, the stable outcome results in agreement near the beginning of
negotiation and is the same as the equilibrium outcome. Contrast
this with the stable outcome corresponding to Figure 5(b), where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Since agreement takes place at
￿
￿, the stable outcome dif-
fers from the equilibrium outcome. But in Figure 8(a),
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,a n d
the stable agreement takes place at the beginning of negotiation,
which is identical to the equilibrium outcome.
For
￿
￿,w h e n
￿
$
￿
￿ is initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ with its
equilibrium strategy (see Figure 6(a)), the outcome was again the
same as the equilibrium outcome. Notice that in this case, initially
all the interactions result in agreement since
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ plays the equi-
librium strategy (i.e., the Conceder NDF). All the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ therefore have the same ﬁtness values. On the other hand,
the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿ have different ﬁtness values.
￿
$
￿
￿ evolves
faster than
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, and stabilizes at a strategy that is the best reply
to the equilibrium strategy played by
￿
$
￿
￿
￿. The new strategies
that get introduced in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, through mutation, being inferior to
its equilibrium strategy, do not survive. Both the populations there-
fore stabilise at their respective equilibrium strategies, and result in
equilibrium outcome.
When both
￿
$
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are initialised randomly (i.e.,
￿
￿), the
stable outcome was again found to be the same as the equilibrium
outcome. Thus, irrespective of the initialization (
￿
￿,
￿
￿,o r
￿
￿)o f
the two subpopulations, the stable outcome is always the same as
the equilibrium outcome.Price
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5.4 Buyer prefers a late agreement and seller
prefers an early one (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿)
We begin with
￿
￿, the case where both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are ini-
tialised totheirrespective equilibrium strategies. Asin theprevious
subsections, the stable outcome was the same as the equilibrium
outcome. For
￿
￿,w h e n
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised randomly and
￿
$
￿
￿
is initialised with its equilibrium strategy, the stable outcome was
the same as the equilibrium outcome. Figure 7(b) shows the initial
populations for this scenario. As seen in the ﬁgure, all the inter-
actions result in agreement. Moreover, since all the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿ play the equilibrium strategy, they all have the same ﬁtness.
The new strategies that are generated through mutation, being infe-
rior to the equilibrium strategy, get eliminated. On the other hand,
the individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ play random strategies and have different
ﬁtness values.
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ thus evolves faster than
￿
$
￿
￿, and stabilizes
at a strategy that is the best reply to the equilibrium strategy played
by
￿
$
￿
￿. The best replyto
￿
$
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿’sequilibriumstrategy. Both
populations thus stabilize at their respective equilibrium strategies.
The stable outcome therefore matches the equilibrium outcome.
For
￿
￿,w h e n
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised with the equilibrium strategy
and
￿
$
￿
￿ is initialised randomly, the stable outcome was again the
same as the equilibrium outcome. As shown in Figure 7(a), all
the initial interactions between the two populations result in agree-
ment. Furthermore, since
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ is initialised with the equilibrium
strategy, all its individuals have the same ﬁtness values, while the
individuals in
￿
$
￿
￿ have different ﬁt n e s sv a l u e sa st h e ya r ei n i -
tialised randomly. Within
￿
$
￿
￿, the closer an individual’s strategy
is to the equilibrium strategy, the higher its ﬁtness is, since it is the
best reply to the equilibrium strategy played by all the individuals
of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿.
￿
$
￿
￿ therefore evolves faster than
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and stabi-
lizes at its equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, the new non-
equilibrium strategies that are generated in
￿
$
￿
￿
￿, through mu-
tation, have an inferior ﬁtness relative to the equilibrium strategy,
and thereby get eliminated. Thus
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ both stabilize at
their respective equilibrium strategies, and result in the equilibrium
outcome.
Finally, when both
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
$
￿
￿ are initialised randomly
(i.e.,
￿
￿), the stable outcome was again found to be the same as
the equilibrium outcome.
￿
$
￿
￿ stabilized at the non-equilibrium
strategy. In the stable strategy of
￿
$
￿
￿
￿ all the elements except the
second, (i.e., the ﬁnal price) were the same as the elements in the
equilibrium strategy. Although the ﬁnal price in the stable strategy
w a sl e s st h a n
￿
￿
￿, it resulted in the equilibrium outcome since
the
￿
￿, the NDF and the deadline were the same as in
￿
￿
￿
￿ (see
Figure 8(b)).
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￿
￿
￿
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￿
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5.5 A summary of key results
The above analysis leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, al-
though game-theoretically each agent has a dominant strategy, the
results of our analysis show that when the population is asymmetric
and the strategies in the two populations co-evolve, the stable out-
come of the evolutionary approach does not always coincide with
the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome. Secondly, as the play-
ers mutually adapt to each other’s strategy, the stable outcome de-
pends on the initial population. More speciﬁcally, when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, the outcomes of these two approaches differ. As seen
in Table 2, the dominant strategy for
￿
￿
￿ (which in our case repre-
sents the buyer) is to initialize the population randomly since this
results in agreement at a lower price. The dominant strategy for
￿
￿
(which represents the seller) is to initialize all the individuals with
its equilibrium strategy. Also, as shown in Table 2, the outcome
generated by the evolutionary approach is more in favour of
￿
￿
￿,
than the equilibrium outcome. The difference however is small.
While the equilibrium price of agreement is 100, the price at the
stable state (for the right initialization) is 95. For all the remaining
scenarios (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for at least one of the agents) the game-
theoretic equilibrium outcome matches the stable outcome of the
evolutionary model, irrespective of how the two populations are
initialised (i.e.,
￿
￿,
￿
￿,o r
￿
￿).
From these ﬁndings it is clear that implementing software agents
usingthe game-theoretic approach iscomputationally simpler(since
the equilibrium strategies can be determined on the basis of the
agents’ information states). Once they are determined, the agents
just need to be coded with these strategies. In contrast, the stable
strategies in the evolutionary model depend on how the popula-
tions are initialised. However, an agent may not know exactly how
the opponent’s population is initialised and, consequently, the GA
learning needs to be done online every time there is a negotiation.
6. RELATED RESEARCH
A number of game-theoretic models have been studied for the bar-
gaining problem under time constraints [14, 15, 8, 6]. A small, but
growing body of literature exists in the ﬁeld of the application of
evolutionary methods to bargaining [9, 18, 4, 1, 3]. Of these, the
ones closer to our work are [18, 4, 1, 3]. Young [18] and Ellingsen
[4] study the evolutionary model for the Nash demand game, while
Binmore et al [1] provide an evolutionary analysis of Rubinstein’s
alternating offers game of complete information [13] that has a sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Cressman and Schlag [3] show the dif-
ference between game-theoretic and evolutionary outcomes for ex-
tensive form games with distinct payoffs (i.e., games in which notwo paths yield the same payoff for one of the players). However,
all these models are based on the assumption that agents are drawn
from a single population, in which all the individuals have the same
utility function. In a more realistic bargaining scenario, the buyer
and the seller have different utility functions. We therefore treat
the population as being asymmetric, i.e., the population is com-
posed of two separate subpopulations - one representing the buyer
and the other representing the seller since they have different util-
ity functions. Our work thus considers competitive co-evolution,
in which ﬁtness is based on direct competition between individu-
als selected from two independently evolving populations of buyers
and sellers. Moreover, we also show that when the two subpopu-
lations co-evolve, then the stable outcome depends on how the two
subpopulations are initialised.
Matos et al [9] use GAs to analyse multi-issue negotiation. The
population comprises of two subpopulations; one representing the
buyer and other representing the seller. They use a ﬁtness function
based on the sum of the score across all the competitions. The
￿
and
￿ populations evolve simultaneously. In real-life bargaining
situations each participant tries to maximize its own utility and not
the sum of the participants’ utilities. We therefore consider two
asymmetric subpopulations in which the strategies co-evolve.
In summary, existing evolutionary models study the bargaining
behavior of agents either for a symmetric population (i.e., they as-
sume that both the parties in a game have the same utility function)
or study the simultaneous evolution of strategies if the population
is asymmetric, by focussing on a speciﬁc negotiation scenario. Our
work differs from existing models in the following ways. Firstly,
we consider an asymmetric population and study the competitive
co-evolution of strategies in the two subpopulations. The second
difference lies in the stable outcomes generated by the evolutionary
models for symmetric and asymmetric populations. For symmetric
games of simultaneous offers it has been shown that the evolution-
ary equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium [17], while
for symmetric games of alternating offers the evolutionarily stable
outcome are close to the game-theoretic equilibrium under certain
conditions [1]. In contrast to this, our study shows that, if the popu-
lation is asymmetric, the stable outcome of the evolutionary model
can differ from the game-theoretic outcome even when each agent
has a dominant strategy at every period at which it makes a move.
Furthermore, our study also highlights the effect of the initial pop-
ulation on the stable state.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studied the bargaining behavior of boundedly rational
agents using GAsand compared the resultswith the game-theoretic
equilibrium outcome, for aparticularmodel of negotiationbased on
negotiation decision functions. In this negotiation game of incom-
plete information, each agent has a unique strategy that is domi-
nant at every information state at which it makes a move. In the
evolutionary counterpart of this model, there is a competitive co-
evolution of strategies between two asymmetric populations. Each
player learns the most effective strategy that is the best reply to
the opponent’s strategy. The key conclusion of our analysis is that
although the agents in the game-theoretic model have dominant
strategies, the stable state of the corresponding evolutionary model
does not always match the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, as
the players mutually adapt to each other’s strategy, the stable out-
come depends on the initial population.
Our present work used genetic algorithm learning to study the
bargaining behavior of boundedly rational agents. In order to get
more general results, it would be interesting to extend the analysis
to other learning mechanisms.
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